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Introduction
In their book Rethinking Expertise, sociolo-
gists Harry Collins and Robert Evans lay out a
framework for classifying expertise which they
dub “The Periodic Table of Expertise” (Collins
& Evans, 2007). They envision the table to take
the form of a ladder, with each rung representing
a different level of specialist expertise (Collins
& Evans, 2007). Collins and Evans revise pre-
existing concepts of this “ladder of expertise” by
including a rung called “interactional expertise.”
Interactional expertise is the second highest rung
on the ladder. It is the level immediately below
“contributory expertise”, which comprises the
highest level of specialist knowledge and is pop-
ulated by PhDs, MDs and the like. According
to Collins and Evans, interactional experts are
proficient in the language of a specialist domain,
but they do not actively practice the science of
that domain.
In this paper I will take a deeper look at how
interactional experts are likely to be perceived
by themselves and by others. In doing so, I will
uncover what I believe are shortcomings of the
“interactional expertise” label. In particular, I
argue that Collins and Evans do not account for
the limitations of interactional expertise caused
by the way contributory experts and laypeople
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perceive the value and credibility of interactional
experts. In Section 1, I provide an overview of
Collins and Evans’ framework for classifying ex-
pertise and outline the definition of interactional
expertise as conceived by Collins and Evans. In
Section 2, I analyze how interactional exper-
tise is assessed and by whom. I examine the
operational definition of interactional expertise
employed by Collins and Evans, as well as a
more inclusive operational definition proposed
by Kathryn Plaisance and Eric Kennedy. In
doing so, I argue that because laypeople can-
not measure interactional expertise, the label is
limited in its ability to bridge the gap between
science and society. In Section 3, I explore the
relationship between contributory experts and
interactional experts, considering the potential
for tensions to arise due to each party overes-
timating the value of their respective expertise.
I continue with a discussion on the merits of a
contributory expert. Then, in Section 4, I dis-
cuss the relative merits of interactional experts,
and claim that while contributory experts can
also possess interactional expertise, they cannot
provide the same value as solely interactional
experts. I argue that the solely interactional ex-
pert can have a different approach to a problem
within a discipline because of their lack of con-
tributory expertise in that discipline. I compare
this claim to a similar account of the value of
differing perspectives seen in design-thinking. In
Section 5, I explore how the unique abilities of an
interactional expert might lead the interactional
expert to inflate the value of their expertise rel-
ative to that of the contributory expert. Finally,
I conclude that optimizing how interactional ex-
pertise is perceived by laypeople, interactional
experts, and contributory experts is a critical
step towards realizing the full benefits of the
interactional expertise concept.
Section 1
In their book, Collins and Evans introduce
the “Periodic Table of Expertise”, a framework
for classifying different levels of expertise and
knowledge (Collins & Evans, 2007). According
to Collins and Evans, there are five levels of
specialist expertises, and they can be viewed as
the five rungs of a “ladder of specialist exper-
tises”. The highest rung on Collins and Evans’
“ladder of specialist expertises” is “contributory
expertise.” Contributory expertise is the kind of
expertise associated with those practicing sci-
ence at its core, such as individuals with PhDs
and researchers. Contributory experts have pro-
gressed through a five stage model of expertise
acquisition, going from novice to advanced be-
ginner, competence, proficiency, and finally to
expertise (Collins & Evans, 2007). As a con-
tributory expert, the individual has embodied
the skills and internalized the content of the sci-
ence (Plaisance, 2015). These experts not only
contribute to the knowledge in their field, but
practice alongside other experts at the core of the
discipline. This “enculturation” is fundamental
for acquiring the tacit knowledge that must be
understood as a contributory expert (Collins &
Evans, 2007). In their book, Collins and Evans
introduce a new level of expertise, “interactional
expertise” which lies immediately below con-
tributory expertise. Interactional expertise is
expertise in a disciplinary language, without ex-
pertise in the corresponding disciplinary practice
(Collins & Evans, 2007). The interactional ex-
pert can speak the language of a discipline with
the same fluency as the contributory expert, but
without actually practicing the skills of the dis-
cipline. Interactional expertise does not require
the acquisition of a formal degree. Rather, it
is achieved by enculturation in the community
of a discipline, without complete immersion in
the physical aspects of the community (Collins
& Evans, 2007).
The addition of interactional expertise as a
level of specialist expertise was the product of
a desire to better classify knowledge and exper-
tise. The concept of interactional expertise was
born out of Collins and Evans’ experiences as so-
ciologists immersed in other specialist domains
(Collins & Evans, 2007). In their work, they
not only collaborate with people of different dis-
ciplinary backgrounds, but delve deep into the
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language of a discipline such that, in speech,
they are indistinguishable from the experts with
whom they are working (Collins & Evans, 2007).
Essentially, Collins and Evans have each ac-
quired interactional expertise, and recognized a
gap in existing expertise classification systems
(Collins & Evans, 2007). They identified that
they possessed a thorough knowledge of a dis-
cipline (in addition to the one in which they
were originally trained); which had previously
not been recognized as significant. In devel-
oping a framework for expertise that included
interactional expertise, Collins and Evans aimed
to address the gap they had identified between
“primary source knowledge” and “contributory
expertise” (Collins & Evans, 2007). By creating
a new level of expertise, Collins and Evans shed
light on the importance of interactional exper-
tise and its unique properties.
Section 2
Collins and Evans‘ development of the in-
teractional expertise label is most successful in
attesting value to the knowledge of individuals
that are fluent in the language of a specialist do-
main without practicing the skills of the domain.
Likewise, the biggest limitation of the interac-
tional expertise label is its lack of far-reaching
credibility. When a hopeful interactional ex-
pert is acquiring their expertise, they undergo
a progression from “interview” to “discussion”
to “conversation” with the contributory expert
(Collins & Evans, 2007). They incrementally
learn more and more of the language until the
contributory expert willingly converses with the
interactional expert about the practice of their
science (Plaisance, 2015), and is even receptive
to critical comments from the interactional ex-
pert (Collins & Evans, 2007). When discoursing
with experts who were not involved in help-
ing the interactional expert gain their expertise,
they must still have their expertise validated by
the individuals or groups with whom they are
interacting. Moreover, while the interactional
expert may be considered credible within the
inner circle of the domain in which they have
interactional expertise, this does not translate
into credibility amongst laypeople farther down
the ladder.
Collins and Evans discuss passing an “imi-
tation game” as the marker of a true interac-
tional expert (Collins & Evans, 2007). To suc-
ceed, an interactional expert must demonstrate
their fluency in the language of a discipline by
proficiently answering domain-specific questions
posed by a judge such that the judge identifies
the individual as a contributory expert. This
method for determining interactional expertise
is challenged by Kathryn Plaisance and Eric
Kennedy in their 2014 paper wherein they build
upon Collins and Evans’ framework to develop a
more pluralistic account of interactional exper-
tise (Plaisance & Kennedy, 2014). The authors
critique Collins and Evans’ adherence to the
imitation game as the defining measure of in-
teractional expertise. Plaisance and Kennedy
posit that in limiting the operational definition
of interactional experts to those that pass the
imitation game, Collins and Evans exclude cer-
tain individuals or groups that possess relevant
interactional expertise in keeping with the orig-
inal operational definition of interactional ex-
pertise as having “enough expertise to interact
interestingly with participants and carry out a
sociological analysis” (Collins & Evans, 2002).
Plaisance and Kennedy therefore argue for a
pluralistic account of interactional expertise, op-
erationally defined by the interactional expert’s
ability to interact interestingly with contribu-
tory experts (Plaisance & Kennedy, 2014).
Both operational definitions, however, re-
quire the evaluator to have contributory exper-
tise. The judge in the imitation game and the
person who identifies instances of “interact[ing]
interestingly” must have contributory expertise
in the domain of interest in order to do so. This
runs counter to one of the primary objectives
of interactional expertise, namely, to increase
the uptake of scientific knowledge and mediate
between scientific communities and important
stakeholders (Plaisance & Kennedy, 2014). If
the concept of interactional expertise is to re-
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alize its full potential, then individuals with
less expertise than an interactional expert (and
therefore contributory expert) must be able to
assess the credibility of an interactional expert.
As it stands, interactional experts may be
trusted by laypeople based on their affiliation
with contributory experts. If the interactional
expert’s credibility is contingent on their associ-
ation with contributory experts, this can add an
additional layer of complexity to the relationship
between interactional expert and contributory
expert.
Section 3
In their book, Collins and Evans discuss how
the different specialist expertises relate to one
another in terms of their transitivity: on the
“ladder of specialist expertises”, those at higher
rungs inherently have the expertise of all the
rungs below them as well (Collins & Evans,
2007). While they establish the transitivity of
the levels of expertise, they do not touch on the
relationship between experts at different levels.
Most lacking is a discussion of the relationship
between interactional experts and contributory
experts. Such a discussion is crucial because the
identity of an interactional expert (and therefore
the definition of interactional expertise) hinges
on that of the contributory expert. Thus, the
inner workings of this relationship are of ut-
most importance as they in turn reveal both the
triumphs and shortcomings of the interactional
expertise label.
The relationship between a contributory ex-
pert and an interactional expert within a domain
has the opportunity to be, and often is, mutually
beneficial. However, tensions may arise between
the two as a result of inflated valuations of ex-
pertise. As mentioned earlier, the contributory
expert has traditional formal, training such as
a doctorate, and has spent years moving up the
academic ranks to achieve this accreditation.
Alternatively, the interactional expert has infor-
mal experience in the specialist domain. Given
the contributory expert’s formal expertise in the
domain of interest, they might value their own
form of expertise more highly than that of the
interactional expert. This may be further ex-
acerbated in the case of an interactional expert
that is not also a contributory expert in an-
other specialist domain. Interactional experts in
this category may already be from marginalized
groups, and therefore may have their relevant ex-
pertise further under-valued by the contributory
expert (Plaisance & Kennedy, 2014). However,
to a certain extent, the contributory expert’s
valuation may be reasonable, and it is impor-
tant to remember that “it is the contributory
experts not the interactional experts who define
and develop the content of the language that
the interactional expert tries to master” (Collins
& Evans, 2007). The contributory experts are
the ones actually doing the science, and while
interactional experts can talk about the science,
they cannot practice it (Collins & Evans, 2007).
Section 4
In establishing the interactional expertise la-
bel, Collins and Evans recognize the value of
interactional experts and their role as special-
ists in a discipline. By definition, interactional
experts cannot perform the work of contribu-
tory experts, but it is equally important to note
that many contributory experts are not doing
the work of interactional experts. The contri-
bution of interactional experts is made possi-
ble by their inherent interactive and reflective
abilities, skills which are not always shared by
contributory experts (Collins & Evans, 2007).
According to Collins and Evans, “interactive
abilities” are interpersonal skills that enable an
individual to communicate and interact with
others. Alternatively, “reflective abilities” are
the contemplative, critical thinking skills that
are vital for an interactional expert’s analy-
sis. The importance of these abilities with
regards to the efficacy of the interactional ex-
pert can be understood through Collins and
Evans’ analogy of the interactional expert as
a coach. When instructing the player how to
perform an action, the coach/interactional ex-
pert must have strong interactive abilities if they
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are to effectively communicate tacit knowledge
to the player/contributory expert (Collins &
Evans, 2007). Interactive ability is the mech-
anism by which interactional experts articulate
tacit knowledge to the contributory expert. This
task lies solely in the hands of the interactional
expert, who has all the tacit knowledge of the
contributory expert, but can still access the rules
and facts that are inaccessible to the contribu-
tory expert, in the same way that an experi-
enced driver often cannot recall how they drove
to work.
Another advantage of the interactional ex-
pert is that they have a different perspective to
think critically about the problems facing the
domain of interest. Collins and Evans state that
one of the basic principles of their table is that
individuals possessing higher levels of expertise
also possess the expertise of all the preceding
levels (Collins & Evans, 2007). Therefore, con-
tributory experts must also possess interactional
expertise, though their interactional expertise
can be either latent or realized (Collins & Evans,
2007). According to Collins and Evans, a solely
interactional expert in a field can add the same
value as a contributory expert in that field who
also has realized interactional expertise (Collins
& Evans, 2007). While both individuals may
be considered to possess interactional expertise
in that field, I disagree that they can add the
same value as interactional experts. Someone
with only interactional expertise in a specific
field has a distinct epistemic perspective from
someone with both contributory expertise and
realized interactional expertise in the same field.
While they are both fluent in the language of
the discipline, they may speak different dialects
that signify where they were “raised”, and where
they learned the language. The solely interac-
tional expert did not receive the same training
as the contributory and interactional expert.
They were not taught the same ideologies, and
were not “raised” with the same disciplinary
norms passed down to the contributory-and-
interactional expert via formal education. For
this reason, the solely interactional expert can
have a different approach to a problem within a
discipline resulting from their lack of contribu-
tory expertise in that discipline.
The added value of differing perspectives is
encountered in design-thinking as well. In his
book Glimmer, Warren Berger collaborates with
top designer Bruce Mau to share how design
can improve our lives and transform the world
(Berger, 2009). According to Berger, the act of
questioning basic assumptions can lead to true
innovation. Along with questioning assump-
tions, reframing familiar problems in unconven-
tional ways can lead to meaningful solutions
(Berger, 2009). These two design principles rely
on the relative “ignorance” of the designer com-
pared to the client. Without the depth of tacit
knowledge tying them down, the designer is able
to look at a problem without subconscious as-
sumptions getting in the way of a solution. Paula
Scher is quoted in Glimmer as saying that “if
youre trying to find a new way to think about
something that makes it better, it can actually
hurt you to have too much experience in that mi-
lieu - because you understand the expectations
too well. And that can cause you to edit your
possibilities based on what you already know
‘doesn’t work’” (Berger, 2009). In the case of
expertise, it is because the interactional expert
isn’t doing the science that they are in a position
to challenge why the contributory expert is doing
something in a certain way, and may then be able
to use their objectivity to find a better way to
do said task. One may be inclined to object the
application of this principle to interactional ex-
perts, because by definition interactional experts
are just as fluent in the language of a discipline
as the contributory experts are, and therefore
they do know the background knowledge. While
they do have more disciplinary knowledge than
the designers Berger describes, they have no ex-
perience actually performing the actions of that
discipline, thereby making this principle appli-
cable.
Section 5
In discussing the relative merits of interac-
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tional and contributory expertise, it is worth
exploring potential complexities that arise in
the relationship between interactional and con-
tributory experts as a result of each expert’s
perception of the other and valuation of the
other’s expertise. The contributory expert, in
keeping with Collins and Evans illustration of a
“ladder of expertises”, can easily view their ex-
pertise as more valuable than that of individuals
lower down the ladder, specifically interactional
experts. The concept of interactional expertise is
defined by the interactional expert’s inability to
do something that the contributory expert can:
practice the science of the specialist domain.
However, after proposing that the interactional
expert is able to add value in a way that the
contributory expert cannot, I now explore the
potential implications of this re-weighted inter-
actional/contributory expert relationship. In
doing so, I do not intend to assign static value
judgements to interactional or contributory ex-
pertise. Rather, I examine the range of ways
in which interactional and contributory experts
perceive each other’s expertise. In doing so,
I identify opportunities to further develop the
concept of interactional expertise in a way that
addresses and responds to possible tensions be-
tween the two groups.
As previously noted, the contributory expert
may over-estimate the value of their expertise
based on their formal training and experience
practicing the science of the domain. Likewise,
the merits of possessing only interactional exper-
tise may cause the interactional expert to inflate
the value of their expertise relative to that of
the contributory expert. This idea is supported
by the findings of a 2007 study on the identi-
ties of creative workers in advertising agencies
(Hackley & Kover, 2007). Authors Chris Hack-
ley and Arthur Kover interviewed copywriters
from several advertising agencies in New York
and described how several interviewees “iden-
tified themselves as members of an elite whose
role it is to use their fine judgment as creative
individuals to inspire consumers” (Hackley &
Kover, 2007). Hackley and Kover note that cre-
atives assume they understand advertising better
than the account managers, even though those
in other departments may undermine the pro-
fessional legitimacy of creative work (Hackley &
Kover, 2007). In the same way that the unique
skillset of creative workers in advertising has
led to elitism amongst certain creative workers,
there is a risk of interactional experts developing
similar attitudes. Although, this may not be a
major cause of concern because the merits of in-
teractional expertise and other integrative skills
are less frequently recognized compared to those
of highly specialized expertise. However, if a con-
tributory expert’s inflated valuation of their own
expertise can be traced back to their disciplinary
training, then we must also be cautious not to
nurture a similar sentiment in interdisciplinary
training that heavily values interactional exper-
tise. The inflated valuations of expertise of both
interactional experts and contributory experts
can threaten the interactional/contributory ex-
pert relationship, and in turn the success of the
concept of interactional expertise as a whole.
Conclusion
The concept of interactional expertise is in-
strumental in legitimizing the expertise that
individuals acquire as a result of enculturation
in a specialist domain without practicing the sci-
ence of that domain. Interactional experts are
uniquely positioned to bridge gaps between sci-
ence and society; however, this ability is limited
by the inability of laypeople to identify interac-
tional expertise. Laypeople cannot serve as the
judge in Collins and Evans’ imitation game, nor
can they necessarily determine whether an indi-
vidual has “interact[ed] interestingly” with con-
tributory experts. Thus, laypeople may perceive
a subject’s interactional expertise only through
their association with contributory experts. This
dependence on contributory experts for deter-
mining interactional expertise has the potential
to complicate the relationship between the two
types of experts. This relationship is already lay-
ered and complex due to the ways contributory
experts and interactional experts each determine
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the value of their own expertise. Contributory
experts, as the highest ranking experts, may
inflate the value of their expertise relative to in-
teractional experts, who do not have traditional,
recognized accreditation nor do they actually
practice the science of the discipline. However,
interactional experts add value in other ways,
including by providing different perspectives not
influenced by experience doing the science. As
such, there is also the potential for interactional
experts to inflate the value of their expertise rel-
ative to that of contributory experts. While not
necessarily realized in all contexts, these possi-
bilities are important to consider as the concept
of interactional expertise continues to develop,
especially because the success of interactional
expertise is closely connected to the success of
the relationship between interactional and con-
tributory experts. Moving forward, Collins and
Evans’ framework can be improved upon by
further addressing the nuances of the interac-
tional expert and contributory expert relation-
ship. Moreover, improving how interactional
expertise is perceived by laypeople, interactional
experts, and contributory experts is a critical
step towards realizing the full benefits of the
interactional expertise concept.
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